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Abstract
We map the space of soundness criteria for secure compila-
tion based on the preservation of hyperproperties in arbitrary
adversarial contexts, which we call robust hyperproperty
preservation. For this, we study the preservation of several
classes of hyperproperties and for each class we propose an
equivalent "property-free" characterization of secure com-
pilation that is generally better tailored for proofs. Even
the strongest of our soundness criteria, the robust preser-
vation of all hyperproperties, seems achievable for simple
transformations and provable using context back-translation
techniques previously developed for showing fully abstract
compilation. While proving the robust preservation of hy-
perproperties that are not safety requires such powerful
context back-translation techniques, for preserving safety
hyperproperties robustly, translating each finite trace prefix
back to a source context seems to suffice.
Extended Abstract
Secure compilation is an emerging field that puts together
advances in programming languages, verification, compil-
ers, and security enforcement mechanisms to devise secure
compiler chains that eliminate many of today’s devastating
low-level vulnerabilities. One class of low-level vulnerabili-
ties arises when code written in a safe language is compiled
and interacts with unsafe code written in a lower-level lan-
guage, e.g., when linking with libraries. While currently all
the guarantees of the source code are generally lost in such
cases, we would like to devise secure compilers that protect
some of the security guarantees established in the source
language even against adversarial low-level contexts.
What is a good soundness criterion for a compiler that
attains this? Fully abstract compilation [1] is a criterion that
provides one potential answer to this question: a fully ab-
stract compiler preserves (and reflects) the observational
equivalence of partial source programs. In more detail, a com-
piler is fully abstract when any two partial source programs
that are observationally indistinguishable by all compatible
adversarial source contexts get compiled to two target-level
programs that are indistinguishable by all adversarial target-
level contexts. While fully abstract compilation has received
significant attention in the literature, the indistinguishabil-
ity of partial programs in all contexts is not the only secu-
rity property one might be interested in preserving. In this
work we set out to explore a much larger space of security
properties that can be preserved even against adversarial
target-level contexts.
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Figure 1. Different notions of robust hyperproperty
preservation. Notions higher in the figure are stronger.
Specifically, we look at preserving classes of hyperproper-
ties despite adversarial contexts. Hyperproperties [2] are a
generalization of trace properties that can express important
security policies such as noninterference. While trace prop-
erties are formally expressed as sets of (potentially infinite)
traces, hyperproperties are sets of sets of traces. Concretely,
these traces are built over events such as inputs from and
outputs to the environment [8]. We say that a complete pro-
gram P satisfies a hyperproperty H when the set of traces
of P is a member of H , or formally {t | P ⇝ t} ∈ H , where
P ⇝ t indicates that program P emits trace t . We say that
a partial program P robustly satisfies [7] a hyperproperty
H when P linked with any (adversarial) context satisfies H .
Armed with this notion of robust satisfaction of hyperprop-
erties, we define secure compilation as preserving the robust
satisfaction of a class of hyperproperties H , so if a partial
source program P robustly satisfies a hyperproperty H ∈ H
(wrt. all source contexts) then its compilation P↓must also
robustly satisfy H (wrt. all target-level contexts).
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We study the preservation of robust satisfaction for var-
ious classes of hyperproperties, many of which are men-
tioned in Figure 1, and which include all hyperproperties,
subset-closed hyperproperties, safety hyperproperties, trace
properties, and safety properties. For each such class we
propose an equivalent “property-free” characterization of
secure compilation that is generally better suited for proofs.
For instance, we prove that preserving all hyperproperties
robustly can be equivalently stated as the following criterion
we call hyper-robust compilation (where C are contexts and
C[P] is the linking of a context C with a program P ):
∀P .∀CT .∃CS .∀t . CT [P↓]⇝ t ⇐⇒ CS [P]⇝ t
This requires that, given a program P , each target context
CT can be mapped to a source context CS in a way that
perfectly preserves the set of traces produced when linking
with P and P↓ respectively. On the other hand, preserving
all trace properties robustly is equivalent to the following
robust compilation criterion:
∀P .∀CT .∀t .∃CS . CT [P↓]⇝ t ⇒ CS [P]⇝ t
Compared to the previous definition, the ∃CS and ∀t quanti-
fiers in this definition are swapped and the implication is in
just one direction: Each (bad) trace in the target can be emu-
lated using a different source contextCS . The intuition is that
if the compiled program is able to produce a trace, that same
trace must also be produceable in the source. Swapping the
quantifiers is crucial for transitioning from hyperproperties
(sets of traces) to properties (traces). The ∀t .∃CS quantifiers
of robust compilation let us pick a different context CS for
each trace t . The reversed ordering ∃CS .∀t of robust hyper-
property preservation instead requires us pick the context
CS before the traces. As a final example, preserving only
safety properties robustly [4] is equivalent to the following
robustly safe compilation criterion:
∀P .∀CT .∀t .CT [P↓]⇝ t ⇒ ∀m≤t . ∃CS t ′.CS [P]⇝ t ′∧m≤t ′
Here only the (bad) finite prefixesm of a potentially infinite
trace t in the target need to be back-simulated in the source.
Safety properties are concerned with (bad) prefixes that must
not happen for the property to hold. If a safety property
holds in the source and some prefix broke this property in
the target, then the same prefix would also exist in the source,
contradicting the fact that the property holds in the source.
Even the strongest of our secure compilation criteria,
hyper-robust compilation, which is, as explained above, equiv-
alent to the robust preservation of all hyperproperties, seems
achievable. We plan to demonstrate this by adapting a recent
fully abstract translation of a simply typed λ-calculus into the
untyped λ-calculus [3]. For this to be interesting, we first ex-
tend the two λ-calculi with a notion of trace by adding inputs
from and outputs to the environment. For achieving hyper-
robust compilation we also extend the source language with
recursive types. This allows us to encode the unitype of un-
typed λ-calculus values using recursive, product, and sum
types, allowing for a precise back-translation of contexts. We
expect that the logical relation proof technique of Devriese
et al. [3] can be adapted to prove the hyper-robust compi-
lation of their translation. Moreover, if we drop recursive
types from the source we expect to still be able to use the
approximate back-translation of Devriese et al. [3] to show
robust hypersafety preservation, a weaker security criterion.
While preserving hyperproperties that are not safety seems
to require powerful context back-translation techniques, for
preserving safety hyperproperties translating each finite
trace prefix individually back to a source context is also pos-
sible. This could potentially be simpler as it can benefit from
proof techniques that are based on trace semantics [5], which
was also used in the context of full abstraction proofs [6, 10].
In Figure 1 we mark in green the secure compilation criteria
for which mapping finite trace prefixes is possible, and in
light purple the ones for which it is not.
Finally, the property-free characterizations of all classes of
hyperproperties from Figure 1 have quantifier alternation of
the form ∀P .∀CT . . . ∃CS . . ., so a (constructive) proof that a
compiler satisfies such a characterization can define CS as
a function of the source program P and the target context
CT . While the dependence of CS on CT is essential in most
cases, the dependence of CS on P is necessary only when
the target language allows the context to make observations
that the source does not allow. For example, the target lan-
guage may have reflection but the source language may not
have it. However, in many cases, this kind of an abstraction
mismatch does not exist and, in fact, many existing proof
techniques [9], including the aforementioned context back-
translation techniques, construct CS only from CT , indepen-
dent of the source program P . This begs the question of what
kinds of properties are actually preserved by a compiler that
satisfies a stronger criterion of the form ∀CT .∃CS .∀P . . .. For
example, what properties of source programs are preserved
by a compiler that satisfies the following stronger variant of
hyper-robust compilation?
∀CT .∃CS .∀P .∀t . CT [P↓]⇝ t ⇐⇒ CS [P]⇝ t
We conjecture that such strong soundness criteria corre-
spond to the robust preservation of relational properties of
programs. In particular, the criterion listed above implies (the
interesting direction of) full abstraction, which is the robust
preservation of a specific relational property, namely, obser-
vational equivalence. Investigating which of the criteria of
Figure 1 imply or are implied by fully abstract compilation
is interesting future work.
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